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4.1. Introduction 
Its EU membership beginning on 1 May 2004 and its joining of the Schen-
gen Area on 21 December 2007 are the most significant moments in the mo-
dern history of the Slovak Republic. With these achievements, a milestone was 
reached towards an unprecedented experience for Slovak citizens: the free mo-
vement of persons within the European Union’s territory. Yet, the accession 
of the Slovak Republic to the European Union also implied new responsibili-
ties, including more efficient control of the Slovak segment of the EU’s eastern 
border.1 The protection of the external Schengen border has become a central 
focus for Slovakia in the context of migration, along with the fight against ille-
gal migration and cross-border crime.2
Since Slovakia gained its independence, the migration profile of the state has 
changed significantly. Slovakia has been transforming gradually from a country 
of emigration to a country of transit, and it is slowly becoming a country of de-
stination. The numbers of all types of migrants have increased and emigration 
from Slovakia has changed from politically motivated (before 1989) to mo-
stly labour emigration. At the beginning of 2014, the number of immigrants 
(i.e., persons with a place of birth outside of Slovakia) on the state’s territory 
was approximately 174,900 (3.2% of the population), of which approximately 
146,300 immigrants (2.7%) were from other EU member states and approxi-
mately 28,600 thousands (0.5%) were from third countries.3
When describing developments in migratory flows, it is necessary to distin-
guish between different types of migrants. In the case of Slovakia, we can cur-
1 The EU criticized Slovakia after its accession for the high permeability of its eastern border. 
Thus, in order to integrate into the Schengen Area, Slovakia had to fulfil various criteria. A period 
of evaluation – the “Schengen evaluation” – took place between 2004 and 2007. On 21 December 2007, 
following a positive final evaluation, Slovakia (as well as the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Malta, Poland and Slovenia) became a full member of the Schengen Area.
2 “Implementácia schengenského acquis v SR”, 2017, Ministerstvo vnútra Slovenskej republiky, http://
www.minv.sk/?implementacia-schengenskeho-acquis-v-sr-1 [accessed: 16.02.2017].
3 “Foreign-born population by country of birth”, 1 January 2014, Eurostat, http://ec.europa.eu/
eurostat/statistics-explained/images/7/79/Foreign-born_population_by_country_of_birth%2C_1_
January_2014_%28%C2%B9%29_YB15.png [accessed: 6.11.2016].
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rently identify the following main immigration flows: voluntary legal migra-
tion, forced migration and illegal or irregular migration. Following the global 
trend, the most frequent type of migration is voluntary legal migration. A si-
gnificant part of these migration flows comprises labour migration, immigra-
tion for family reasons or immigration for study. Among forced migrants, we 
can count asylum seekers as well as other categories of migrants entitled to seek 
international protection. However, the Bureau of the Border and Aliens Poli-
ce of the Ministry of the Interior of the SR counts asylum seekers in the illegal 
migration statistics, because they usually cross the borders without legal per-
mission. We do not distinguish between different categories of illegal migrants 
– it is very challenging, as is determining the exact numbers of illegal migrants. 
In connection to our topic, which is the current migration and refugee crisis and 
its impacts in Slovakia, we will not pay attention to voluntary legal migration 
but solely to irregular immigration and the forced migration of asylum seekers.
4.1.1. Forced Migration: Refugees and Asylum Seekers
The numbers and the structure of the countries of origin of forced migrants4 
usually reflect current world political, social and economic developments. 
The number of asylum seekers in Slovakia started to increase gradually in 2001. 
Between 2001 and 2004, migration for asylum was growing much faster than 
other types of immigration to Slovakia. In 2004, when Slovakia became a mem-
ber state of the EU, the number of asylum applications reached its peak. 
This “quantitative boom” was caused by several factors. One can point 
to a link between the development of asylum legislation and developments 
in the field of illegal migration. Illegal migrants increasingly used (or abused) 
“the liberal spirit of the asylum law”, although their primary intention was not 
to apply for asylum.5 Foreigners who were detained, or who would have been 
expelled following an administrative or judicial decision, tried to avoid depor-
tation by applying for one of the three forms of international protection exi-
sting in the Slovak Republic: asylum (reflecting the 1951 Geneva Convention), 
humanitarian asylum or subsidiary protection, with the hope of legalizing 
4 The term “forced migration” is used to describe “...a migratory movement in which an element 
of coercion exists, including threats to life and livelihood” (International Organization for Migration, 
Glossary on Migration, 2nd Edition, Geneva, IOM International Organization for Migration, 2011) 
Forced migration can arise from natural or man-made causes (e.g., armed conflicts, development projects, 
nuclear disasters). However, it is necessary to point out that according to international law, not all forced 
migrants are refugees, as the term “refugee” itself is defined in the Geneva Convention of 1951 less 
extensively in the above-mentioned document.
5 B. Divinský, Migračné trendy v Slovenskej republike po vstupe krajiny do EÚ (2004–2008), Bratislava, 
IOM Medzinárodná organizácia pre migráciu, 2009.
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their residence in Slovakia in this way. However, many of them left the territory 
of Slovakia over the course of the asylum procedure, even before a final de-
cision on asylum was reached. This was the main reason for which, despite 
a considerable number of applications, asylum was only granted to a small num-
ber of applicants, and for which the data on refused, suspended or withdrawn 
applications for asylum can provide an indication of the state of illegal migra-
tion in Slovakia.6 In our opinion, this “historical experience” with the misuse 
of the asylum system could have had impact on the attitude of Slovaks concer-
ning refugees from the current crisis. 
In 2005, the asylum situation changed radically. The number of asylum se-
ekers fell sharply, mainly because of the decrease in the number of detained il-
legal migrants in Slovakia. Another important factor explaining this tendency 
was the application of the Dublin Regulation and the Eurodac system on the 
Slovak territory. Since then, the situation has been relatively stable and the re-
fugee crisis did not significantly change the status quo in Slovakia. In 2015, the 
number of asylum applications was nearly the same (330 applications) as it had 
been in 2014 (331 applications); asylum was granted to eight people and sub-
sidiary protection to 41 people in 2015.
Table 4.1
Asylum and Subsidiary Protection in the Slovak Republic (since 2010)
Year
Number 
of asylum 
applications
Granted Refused
Subsidiary 
protection
granted 
/refused
Procedure 
suspended
Citizenship 
granted
2010 541 15 180 57/104 361 3
2011 491 12 186 91/48 270 7
2012 732 32 334 104/153 383 0
2013 441 15 123 34/49 351 7
2014 331 14 197 99/41 163 12
2015 330 8 124 41/24 148 5
2016 127 164 75 11/13 30 0
Total 58,448 817 7,983 683/1,512 49,468 238
Source: Ministerstvo vnútra Slovenskej republiky, http://www.minv.sk/?statistiky-20 
[accessed: 16.11.2016].
It is not a coincidence that we do not use the term refugee very often in the 
Slovak context. In fact, this is a rather unknown term in Slovak legislation. 
The terminology used in Slovakia is as follows. For migrants applying for asy-
6 A. Mrlianová, N. Ulrichová, M. Zollerová, Praktické opatrenia v boji proti nelegálnej migrácii 
v Slovenskej republike, Národná štúdia pre Európsku migračnú sieť, Bratislava, Národný kontaktný bod 
Európskej migračnej siete v Slovenskej republike, 2011.
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lum in Slovakia in line with the Geneva Convention of 1951, the term asylum 
seeker is used. Yet, asylum seekers who succeed are not referred to as refugees, 
but “azylant”; the most proper English equivalent of the Slovak term “azylant” 
would be “a person who has been granted asylum” (we will also use the term 
“recognized asylum seekers” because this expression is used in English transla-
tions of statistics and overviews published by the Ministry of the Interior of the 
SR, which are quoted in this text). Subsidiary protection or humanitarian asy-
lum, generally speaking, is granted according to the non-refoulement or family 
reunification principles.
4.1.2. Illegal Immigration
According to representatives of Slovak NGOs, the main causes of illegal 
immigration are grounded in the lack of legal opportunities, or the multitude 
of administrative obstacles, that migrants have to face to make it to Slovakia 
legally. This situation is not specific to Slovakia, but is generally true of more 
European countries.
As has already been mentioned above, statistics for irregular immigrants are 
more or less estimates, since they usually only display the volume of known il-
legal immigration. Data concerning the number of detained persons, the denial 
of entry into Slovak territory, refused or withdrawn applications for asylum, 
decisions on administrative or judicial expulsion and refused entry and returns, 
can be used to analyse trends in illegal immigration.7
Table 4.2
An Overview of Selected Data Indicating Developments in Illegal Immigration (since 2010)
Year 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
Number of detained persons 1,440 1,219 1,479 1,091 1,304 2,535
Illegal state border crossings 495 390 658 398 240 222
Illegal stays in the territory 945 829 821 693 1,064 2,313
Refusal of entry 841 604 614 449 517 486
Issued decisions of expulsion 871 700 571 643 1,027 1,720
Effective expulsion 598 576 404 432 725 1,261
Source: “Statistical yearbooks of the Bureau of the Border and Aliens Police”, Minister-
stvo vnútra Slovenskej republiky, http://www.minv.sk/?rocenky [accessed: 16.11.2016].
Based on the data shown in Table 4.2, we can conclude that the number 
of detected illegal immigrants was decreasing until 2014. Presumably, this is the 
result of measures introduced following Slovakia’s integration into the Schengen 
7 Ibidem.
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Area, mainly with regard to the stricter protection of the country’s eastern 
border with Ukraine. However, we should also point out that the abolition 
of controls at the internal borders makes the detection of illegal border crossings 
more difficult and thus, the detection of illegal immigrants is moving inland.
In 2015, the situation changed significantly as the authorities recorded 
an almost 100% increase in illegal migration. We can conclude that the mi-
gration and refugee crisis also left its mark on Slovak territory, although in ab-
solute numbers, with 2,535 detected irregular migrants, we cannot talk about 
a real crisis in fact.
In terms of nationality, most irregular immigrants are Ukrainians 
(see Table 4.3: the numbers in brackets refer to the total number of irregular 
migrants revealed by state border crossing or illegal stay). Usually, these are so-
called “over-stayers” (people who have stayed in Slovakia after their permission 
to do so has expired). Most of them are also working illegally. Yet, the migra-
tion and refugee crisis is reflected in the national composition of irregular mi-
grants in Slovakia – increased numbers of irregular migrants from Syria and 
Iraq are recorded in 2014 and 2015, compared to previous years.
Table 4.3
An Overview of Illegal Migration by Nationality 2010–2015 (Top Five Countries)
2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
Ukraine 
(377)
Ukraine 
(400)
Ukraine 
(380)
Ukraine 
(393)
Ukraine 
(550)
Ukraine
(867)
Moldova 
(244)
Somalia 
(215)
Somalia 
(287)
Afghanistan 
(120)
Afghanistan 
(154)
Syria
(582)
Afghanistan 
(194)
Moldova 
(110)
Moldova 
(101)
Somalia 
(61)
Kosovo 
(91)
Afghanistan
(265)
Somalia 
(151)
Afghanistan 
(77)
Afghanistan 
(84)
Moldova 
(58)
Syria 
(76)
Iraq
(146)
Georgia 
(86)
Russian Federation 
(64)
Georgia 
(70)
Georgia 
(57)
Vietnam 
(56)
Kosovo
(120)
Source: ibidem.
The fact is, that even in times of crisis, Slovakia has not become a final de-
stination for asylum seekers and irregular immigrants. As we have already men-
tioned, the total number of detained persons in 2015 was 2,535. Some 222 
of them (approximately 8.76%) were caught when they crossed the border 
illegally, and 2,313 (approximately 91.24%) were caught while staying illegally 
on the territory of Slovakia (see Figure 2). Compared to the “pre-crisis” period, 
the number of irregular migrants revealed inside the territory of the Slovak 
Republic has increased. With the exception of Ukrainians, most of whom were 
discovered on the state border when leaving the territory of the Slovak Repu-
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blic (619 persons out of 867 in 2015), the majority of irregular migrants from 
the other top five nationalities in 2015 (385 Syrians out of 582; 117 Afghanis 
out of 265; 93 Iraqis out of 146; 103 persons from Kosovo out of 120, respec-
tively) were discovered within the territory; this could also have been caused by 
more comprehensive controls resulting from more intensive illegal migration 
flows in the whole region.8 This fact also indicates that most irregular migrants 
(excepting Ukrainians) did not use the eastern border of the Slovak Republic 
to get into EU territory.
In connection with this topic, it is necessary to briefly evaluate the effecti-
veness of Slovak border surveillance on the eastern external border of the EU. 
Slovakia is responsible for a rather short segment of this strategic dividing line: 
the Slovak-Ukrainian border is only around 100 km long, which has allowed 
the country to concentrate its human, technical and financial resources on a re-
latively short segment of its border.9
In fact, the main and most original component of the border management 
system on the Slovak-Ukrainian border is a “virtual fence” in the form of a ca-
mera chain: some of the cameras are placed inside the border crossing points10 
(BCPs), but most of the cameras form a line running from the Hungarian-
Ukrainian-Slovak border tripoint from the south to the north. This system has 
been implemented mainly in the southern plain, excluding most of the nor-
thern mountainous part. The topography of the northern region itself compli-
cates movement for migrants, as well as for the border police.
The Operational Centre of Border Police Directorate, the headquarters 
of the border police, is located in Sobrance, a city near the Ukrainian border. 
The headquarters includes a control room where all of the camera chain ca-
meras are monitored. Pictures from the border are also visible in the Ministry 
of the Interior of the SR, in Bratislava. However, this border is not the central 
point for migrations and human trafficking. On the other hand, smuggling 
(petrol, alcohol and cigarettes) is more often the cause of border police inte-
rvention in this locality.11
8 And in the Slovak case, probably also because of more intensive controls against illegal employment.
9 The total border envelope of the Slovak Republic is 1,652.2 km in length; Slovakia borders Hungary 
(654.8 km), Poland (541.1 km), the Czech Republic (251.8 km), Austria (106.7 km) and Ukraine (97.8 km) 
(minv.sk, 2016e).
10 The border police units are placed all along the Ukraine border in 10 small villages. North to south, 
these units are located in the villages of Zboj, Topoľa, Ulič, Ubľa, Podhoroď, Petrovce, Vyšné Nemecké, 
Maťovské Vojkovce (railway cargo BCP only), Veľké Slemence and Čierna nad Tisou (railway BCP). The 
most important unit is located in Vyšné Nemecké, the location of the main road BCP and the only one 
for lorries between the two countries.
11 In July 2012, a tunnel was detected on the border, equipped with a small train capable of transporting 
various kinds of goods or people. It was dug six metres underground and was around 700 metres long 
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8 And in the Slovak case, probably also because of more intensive controls against illegal employment.
9 The total border envelope of the Slovak Republic is 1,652.2 km in length; Slovakia borders Hungary 
(654.8 km), Poland (541.1 km), the Czech Republic (251.8 km), Austria (106.7 km) and Ukraine (97.8 km) 
(minv.sk, 2016e).
10 The border police units are placed all along the Ukraine border in 10 small villages. North to south, 
these units are located in the villages of Zboj, Topoľa, Ulič, Ubľa, Podhoroď, Petrovce, Vyšné Nemecké, 
Maťovské Vojkovce (railway cargo BCP only), Veľké Slemence and Čierna nad Tisou (railway BCP). The 
most important unit is located in Vyšné Nemecké, the location of the main road BCP and the only one 
for lorries between the two countries.
11 In July 2012, a tunnel was detected on the border, equipped with a small train capable of transporting 
various kinds of goods or people. It was dug six metres underground and was around 700 metres long 
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Despite all of these technical measures, there can still be human error. 
According to information recently presented in the media, four policemen 
from the border police have been accused of helping with the smuggling of mi-
grants – we are perhaps talking here about hundreds of migrants with false EU 
member state passports.12
4.2. Migration Policy
4.2.1. Legal Framework
Shortly after gaining its independence, it was necessary for the Slovak 
Republic to respond to international migration flows: both immigration flows 
heading for Slovak territory and the emigration of Slovak citizens out of the co-
untry. The need to express attitudes and clearly determine approaches towards 
respective types of migration became even more intensive due to Slovakia’s am-
bitions to join the EU. In parallel, integration initiatives determined procedu-
res in some areas of migration management in Slovakia. Even before joining 
the EU, the new Act on Asylum was passed13 and fundamental institutional 
reforms were carried out.
In the context of immigration and asylum in the Slovak Republic, the Act 
on Asylum No. 480/2002 and the Act on Residence of Aliens No.404/2011 
are considered to be the most relevant Acts. The Act on Asylum reflects the 
Geneva Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees of 1951 (respectively the 
New York Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees of 1967), and now it also 
reflects all relevant EU directives and regulations in this area. The law addresses 
the issue of asylum, in particular the rights and obligations of asylum seekers 
and persons granted asylum (refugees), as well as the conditions for granting 
subsidiary protection and humanitarian asylum.
The Act on Residence of Aliens No. 404/2011 has already been amended 
four times since its entry into force in 2011. The most important change came 
into force on 1 December 2012. This amendment repealed previous legislation 
and merged into one document all laws dealing with border crossing and bor-
der surveillance, as well as those defining the conditions of foreigners’ residence 
(Reuters, “Slovaks Find Railway Smuggling Tunnel to Ukraine”, 19 July 2012, reuters.com, http://www.
reuters.com/article/us-slovakia-ukraine-tunnel-idUSBRE86I0ZO20120719 [accessed: 20.10.2016].
12 Správy RTVS, 6 December 2016, 25. – 27.15 min., https://www.rtvs.sk/televizia/archiv/9936/ 
112663 (accessed: 10.12.2016).
13 In the Slovak Republic laws are passed by the Parliament which is called the National Council, and 
signed by the President of the country.
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within the territory.14 The new regulation was necessary because of the need to 
harmonize Slovak laws with European legislation – policies in the area of mi-
gration management and the integration of foreigners in the Slovak Republic 
needed to be linked with developments and trends in the EU member states. 
Several laws were passed or amended to transpose the relevant EU legislation 
into Slovak legislation.15
In the context of the integration of immigrants in the Slovak Republic 
(we also include recognized asylum seekers in this category) the Act on State 
Citizenship No 40/1993 is regarded as the most relevant. Among other things, 
this Act regulates the granting of Slovak citizenship to a foreigner by natura-
lization. In ensuring effective integration, equally important are the rules for 
the employment of foreigners, regulated by the Act on Employment Services 
No 5/2004.16 The issue of illegal employment (which can also include the ille-
gal employment of foreigners or immigrants) is handled by the Act on Illegal 
Work and Illegal Employment No. 82/2005. This Act, on the one hand, bans 
illegal work and employment, and on the other, regulates activities for the con-
trol of, and sanctions for, illegal work.
There have not been many legislative changes made as a result of the migra-
tion crisis. In particular, it is important to mention an amendment to the Act 
on Freedom of Religion and the Status of Churches and Religious Societies, 
which was approved on 30 December 2016. The draft proposed to raise the 
number of signatures necessary to register a new religious society in the Slovak 
Republic from 20,000 to 50,000.17 The leader of the Slovak National Party and 
the Chairmen of the Slovak National Council, Andrej Danko, presented this 
bill as one of the measures to fight the Islamization of the country.18 The Slovak 
President returned the amendment to the Parliament for additional discussion, 
but on 31 January 2017 the Parliament definitively approved the legislation.
After a very brief overview of the most relevant laws, we would like to point 
out developments to and the current appearance of the conceptual documents 
regulating Slovak migration policy. These documents set up the goals of the 
Slovak Republic’s migration policy and determine the framework of the Acts 
mentioned above.
14 The existing types of residence permits (temporary residence, permanent residence and tolerated 
stay) remain valid. Concerning the permanent residence permit, the law distinguishes between permits 
for unlimited and long-term stays.
15 I. Bachtíková, Organizácia azylovej a migračnej politiky v Slovenskej republike, Bratislava, Národný 
kontaktný bod Európskej migračnej siete v Slovenskej republike 2014.
16 It is possible to find relevant laws in many other related areas – health care, education, etc.
17 Its members should be Slovak citizens over 18 years of age, with permanent residence in Slovakia.
18 “Podmienky na registráciu cirkvi a náboženskej spoločnosti sa sprísnia”, 30 November 2016, TASR, http://
www.teraz.sk/slovensko/podmienky-na-registraciu-cirkvi-a-nabo/231027-clanok.html [accessed: 10.12.2016].
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The enormous motivation of the Slovak Republic to become a member 
of the European Union also accelerated its effort to formulate an official migra-
tion policy for the country. The first Migration Policy Concept of the Slovak 
Republic was adopted for the period 2005–2010. This document was eviden-
tly influenced by Slovak integration ambitions, and by its following EU acces-
sion. The objectives of its migration policy are formulated in this document 
in order to provide for Slovak national interests on the one hand and to harmo-
nize Slovak legal norms with EC/EU law on the other. Among its basic princi-
ples, which rule over the spirit of the conception, active cooperation with the 
EU was central. 
The text of the introduction of the document Conceptual Plans of the Mi-
gration Policy of the SR for the Period 2011–2015 also focuses on the role 
of international organizations in dealing with the international migration and 
asylum agenda; it also notes the vital importance of the EU for the Slovak Re-
public. At present, the key document of the SR’s migration policy is the Mi-
gration Policy of the Slovak Republic – Perspective until the Year 2020. In its 
introduction, the Slovak Republic expresses its preparedness and willingness to 
participate in the harmonization of the migration policies of EU member sta-
tes, as well as its commitment to the basic principles, operational mode and 
management of migration in the EU. An important part of this strategic do-
cument is the formulation of Slovak migration policy objectives, which can be 
summarized as follows:
1) Create conditions for legal migration, but respecting the priorities, 
needs and reception capacities of the SR, including the capacity to in-
tegrate immigrants into society;
2) Strengthen the effectiveness of border controls and fight against illegal 
migration;
3) Contribute to the adoption of a common European asylum system; par-
ticipate on the creation of a global partnership with countries of origin 
and transit; encourage synergy between migration and development.
Currently, the issue of migration is often presented in connection with na-
tional and international security. In 2017, there is a plan to adopt a new Secu-
rity Strategy, as well as a new Defence Strategy of the Slovak Republic. The exi-
sting strategic documents were adopted shortly after the accession of the SR to 
the EU. Since then, the security environment has changed and the basic stra-
tegic documents need to be revised. The most significant change in the securi-
ty environment in Europe was caused by the conflict in Ukraine; nevertheless, 
the unstable situation in the southern neighbourhood of the EU, the immedia-
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te threat of terrorism, mass migration and hybrid threats are also mentioned as 
important reasons for the adoption of the new strategies. Thus, it is expected 
that in the new Security Strategy of the Slovak Republic, substantial attention 
will be dedicated to migration issues (primarily illegal migration).19
4.2.2. Institutional Framework
The Government of the Slovak Republic – the highest executive body 
– consists of 13 departments. All of the Slovak Ministries are at least marginal-
ly related to some aspect of migration. Nevertheless, the area of international 
migration falls mainly under the auspices of three departments: the Ministry 
of the Interior, the Ministry of Foreign and European Affairs and the Mini- 
stry of Labour, Social Affairs and Family.
The Ministry of the Interior of the SR implements its agenda in the field 
of migration and asylum mainly through two bodies: the Migration Office and 
the Bureau of the Border and Aliens Police.
The Migration Office of the Ministry of the Interior of the SR is the first 
instance body which decides on the granting of asylum and subsidiary protec-
tion to foreigners. The Migration Office usually supervises projects financed by 
European funds, provides methodological guidance and consultation in this 
area and cooperates with the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner 
for Refugees and the International Organization for Migration. Furthermore, 
it provides basic care for asylum seekers. For this reason, the Migration Office 
runs three types of facility – “reception centres” and “accommodation centres” 
for asylum seekers in Slovakia, and an “integration centre” in Zvolen for per-
sons who have been already granted asylum.20 At present, there are three open 
facilities for asylum seekers: the “reception centre” in Humenné (with a capa-
city of 550 beds), as well as the “accommodation centres” in Opatovská Nová 
Ves and Rohovce (both with a capacity of 140 beds each and the possibility 
of expansion, if needed). In the past, there were four reception facilities (in 
Adamov-Gbely, Vlachy, Rohovce and Opatovská Nová Ves) and two accom-
modation facilities (in Gabčíkovo and Brezová pod Bradlom), but they were 
closed due to a decrease in asylum applications. The facility in Gabčíkovo has 
recently been re-opened, as we mention later in the text.
19 “Vláda schválila zmeny v Bezpečnostnej a Obrannej stratégii SR”, SITA, 13 September 2016, 
http://spravy.pravda.sk/domace/clanok/405010-vlada-schvalila-zmeny-v-bezpecnostnej-a-obrannej-
strategii-sr/ [accessed: 15.01.2017].
20 M. Michálková, Organizácia azylových zariadení pre žiadateľov o azyl v Slovenskej republike, 
Bratislava, Národný kontaktný bod Európskej migračnej siete v Slovenskej republike 2013.
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In Humenné, there is also the Emergency Transit Centre (ETC) with ca-
pacity for 150 persons, which serves refugees awaiting resettlement in the new 
home country. There are only two such centres in the world (the other is in 
Timișoara, Romania; a third one, in Manila in the Philippines, is no longer 
operational). The Emergency Transit Centre in Humenné was originally set up 
in 2009 for a group of Palestinian refugees from Iraq. In 2010, the agreement 
was extended and the ETC in Humenné became a permanent evacuation facili-
ty, the second emergency facility to be established in Central Europe. Emergen-
cy Transit Centres provide temporary placements for refugees in need of im-
mediate evacuation from the first country of refuge due to concerns over their 
safety or the threat of being returned to the territory they fled from. Refugees 
can stay in the ETC for up to six months while their resettlement to a host co-
untry is finalized. The ETC can also provide migrants with language training 
and basic information about the culture of receiving states.21
The Bureau of the Border and Aliens Police of the Presidium of Police For-
ce22 directly manages tasks within the field of border protection; fighting illegal 
migration and the smuggling of migrants; border control; risk analyses; coope-
ration with the FRONTEX Agency; analysis of travel documents; granting re-
sidence to foreigners; expulsion; visa issues and finally, to a limited extent, asy-
lum procedures and the implementation of the Dublin Regulation.
To fight illegal migration, the National Unit of Combating Illegal Migra-
tion was set up within the Bureau of Border and Aliens Police. Illegal immi-
grants are placed in Útvary policajného zaistenia pre cudzincov [police deten-
tion units for foreigners] located in Medveďov, near the Hungarian border, and 
in Sečovce, close to the Ukrainian border. Both facilities are under the autho-
rity of the Ministry of the Interior of the SR and are operated by the Bureau 
of Border and Aliens Police. These units carry out activities connected to the 
detention, return and expulsion of third-country nationals.23
The Ministry of Foreign and European Affairs participates in the develop-
ment of the foreign policy of the Slovak Republic and implements it. At le-
ast in the last few years, international migration has formed a substantial part 
of the Slovak foreign policy agenda. Within the framework of its consular agen-
da, the Ministry fulfils tasks related to issuing visas to foreigners via its consu-
lates and embassies abroad. From this point of view, the granting of long-term 
visas that might lead to residence permits is important. Slovak consulates rece-
21 “Emergency Transit Centre”, UNHCR, http://www.unhcr-centraleurope.org/en/what-we-do/reset 
tlement/etc-humenne.html [accessed: 10.12.2016].
22 “Úrad hraničnej a cudzineckej polície P PZ”, Ministerstvo vnútra Slovenskej republiky, http://www.
minv.sk/?uhcp [accessed: 18.11.2016].
23 I. Bachtíková, op. cit.
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ive applications for citizenship or residence in the Slovak Republic and provide 
assistance and information to the applicants. The Ministry also assists with the 
voluntary return or expulsions of migrants, or with the preparation of readmis-
sion agreements.
The Ministry of Labour, Social Affairs and Family draws up legal norms 
and determines the legal regulations for the employment of foreigners, inclu-
ding the elaboration of entry criteria for different categories of foreign nationals 
into the Slovak labour market and the granting of work permits. The Ministry 
of Labour, Social Affairs and Family not only assists eligible categories of mi-
grants in mediating employment – the Central Office of Labour, Social Affairs 
and Family helps to combat the illegal employment of foreigners. This ministry 
is responsible for establishing legal norms regarding social care for foreigners, 
asylum seekers, repatriated persons, Slovaks living abroad, etc. and the Centre 
for Coordination of the Integration of Foreigners plays an important role in the 
integration of foreigners.
Concerning the statistical data on migration in the Slovak Republic, infor-
mation is collected for different types of migration and categories of migrants. 
The relevant state institutions responsible for data collection are as follows. 
Statistics in the field of legal migration24– the Statistical Office of the Slovak 
Republic; statistics on international protection – the Migration Office of the 
Ministry of the Interior of the Slovak Republic; statistics on the prevention 
of unlawful entry and residence (illegal migration), statistics on residence per-
mits and the residence of third country nationals, statistics on returns – the Bu-
reau of the Border and Aliens Police of the Presidium of Police Force; statistics 
on foreign workers – the Central Office of Labour, Social Affairs and Family. 
All statistics are collected in accordance with EU legislation.25
4.2.3. Social Integration
Concerning the integration of immigrants, the Slovak Republic follows, at 
least formally, all European Union standards. The first strategic document in 
the area of integration was the Concept of Foreigner Integration in the Slovak 
Republic, passed in 2009. This document focused on the integration of third 
country citizens who had been residing legally in the Slovak Republic for at 
least one year. Because the goal of successful integration was not fulfilled, the 
24 The term legal migration covers the entry of persons into the territory of the Slovak Republic, 
as well as their residence in and departure from the Slovak Republic in accordance with international 
agreements and legal regulations.
25 “Systém demografickej štatistiky a štatistiky zahraničnej migrácie v SR”, Štatistický úrad SR, 2016, 
http://archiv.statistics.sk/html/showdoc.dodocid=6605.html [accessed: 15.12.2016].
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21 “Emergency Transit Centre”, UNHCR, http://www.unhcr-centraleurope.org/en/what-we-do/reset 
tlement/etc-humenne.html [accessed: 10.12.2016].
22 “Úrad hraničnej a cudzineckej polície P PZ”, Ministerstvo vnútra Slovenskej republiky, http://www.
minv.sk/?uhcp [accessed: 18.11.2016].
23 I. Bachtíková, op. cit.
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ive applications for citizenship or residence in the Slovak Republic and provide 
assistance and information to the applicants. The Ministry also assists with the 
voluntary return or expulsions of migrants, or with the preparation of readmis-
sion agreements.
The Ministry of Labour, Social Affairs and Family draws up legal norms 
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ding the elaboration of entry criteria for different categories of foreign nationals 
into the Slovak labour market and the granting of work permits. The Ministry 
of Labour, Social Affairs and Family not only assists eligible categories of mi-
grants in mediating employment – the Central Office of Labour, Social Affairs 
and Family helps to combat the illegal employment of foreigners. This ministry 
is responsible for establishing legal norms regarding social care for foreigners, 
asylum seekers, repatriated persons, Slovaks living abroad, etc. and the Centre 
for Coordination of the Integration of Foreigners plays an important role in the 
integration of foreigners.
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mation is collected for different types of migration and categories of migrants. 
The relevant state institutions responsible for data collection are as follows. 
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as well as their residence in and departure from the Slovak Republic in accordance with international 
agreements and legal regulations.
25 “Systém demografickej štatistiky a štatistiky zahraničnej migrácie v SR”, Štatistický úrad SR, 2016, 
http://archiv.statistics.sk/html/showdoc.dodocid=6605.html [accessed: 15.12.2016].
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new Integration Policy of the Slovak Republic was drawn up in 2014. This do-
cument contains principles and new goals, as well as the identification of focus 
groups, measures and levels of integration to follow. The integration of non-ci-
tizens in the Slovak Republic takes place according to the basic principles outli-
ned in this document.
Slovakia does not have much experience with the integration of migrants. 
However, there is a significant Roma population and a Hungarian minority 
living in the country, and therefore the integration of third country migrants 
can reflect experiences with the aforementioned groups. The document Inte-
gration policy 2014 places emphasis on activities of local governments in the 
integration process and outlines five main areas for migrant integration: ho-
using, cultural and social integration, education, health care and employment. 
All of them are interconnected and it is necessary to treat them as one complex 
entity. Despite the fact that strategic documents do exist, their practical appli-
cation is still missing.
Authorities and academics agree on one point – local authorities, i.e., muni-
cipalities, need to play a crucial role in the integration of immigrants. To pro-
mote the integration of foreigners, as well as to raise awareness of foreigners 
in the local community, seven Slovak towns (Michalovce, Svidník, Snina, Ban-
ská Bystrica, Prievidza, Dolný Kubín and Senec) have participated in the pro-
ject Budovanie kapacít na úrovni miestnej územnej samosprávy v oblasti inte-
gračnej politiky [Capacity building at the level of local government in the area 
of integration policy, BUK].26 This can be perceived as the first step towards 
a well-functioning integration policy.
Based on the experiences of countries with a longer history of immigration, 
the lack of integration policies in the state might cause problems connected 
with the possible creation of large groups of segregated migrants, who do not 
speak the language of the receiving country, do not have any particular educa-
tion and have difficulties finding jobs and therefore become a burden on the 
economic and social system, therefore presenting the potential for radicaliza-
tion. Successful integration might, on the contrary, solve some of Slovakia’s 
demographic and economic problems and serve the state as well as migrants. 
The Migration Office provides assistance with accommodation, language pre-
paration, employment or education, and health and social security for recogni-
zed asylum seekers and persons granted subsidiary protection. In the process 
of integrating migrants into society, the Migration Office closely cooperates 
26 “Legálni migranti sa na Slovensku uchytili. Pracujú, študujú a podnikajú”, aktuality.sk, 26 June 2015, 
https://www.aktuality.sk/clanok/278348/legalni-migranti-sa-na-slovensku-uchytili-pracuju-studuju 
-a-podnikaju/ [accessed: 15.01.2017].
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with local NGOs. Slovak civil society is very active in the area of integrating 
immigrants. Only basic services for asylum seekers and persons whose asylum 
has been granted are covered from the state budget.27 Non-governmental orga-
nizations provide for additional services – social and psychological assistance, 
legal advice, education (particularly through the teaching of the Slovak langu-
age), leisure activities, help with additional materials and health care, as well 
as translation services.
In order to remove the language barrier, there are courses in the Slovak lan-
guage organized for foreigners. In the field of education, the law guarantees 
that the children of non-nationals asylum seekers in Slovakia will receive educa-
tion under the same conditions as are enjoyed by Slovak citizens, according to 
the principle of non-discrimination. The training of teachers should qualitati-
vely and financially be assured by the Ministry of Education, Science, Research 
and Sport. Yet, this is not always the case. The language courses are frequently 
of poor quality, which causes further problems. As well as having a poor know-
ledge of the Slovak language, the children of migrants are often assigned to lo-
wer classes and their parents cannot find an appropriate job without knowledge 
of the Slovak language. Thus, although the legislature is respected, its practical 
application does not have the desired outcomes.28
The employment of immigrants is one of the most effective tools of inte-
gration. According to current Slovak legislation, migrants from third countries 
need a work permit to be employed in Slovakia. Yet, the employer cannot give 
a job to a foreigner unless he is unable to find an appropriate native Slovak can-
didate. Persons who have been granted asylum in Slovakia do not need a permit 
and are eligible to work under the same conditions as Slovak nationals. Asy-
lum seekers can only work after nine months have elapsed since they applied 
for asylum in Slovakia.
In connection to this topic, we would like to point to another important 
issue – the issue of the ageing population and a low fertility rate, which is 
a problem for the entire EU, including the Slovak Republic. In 2014, the total 
fertility rate in Slovakia was 1.37 and the average life expectancy at birth was 
77 years.29 This fact creates an enormous burden on the country’s retirement 
system, with a rising population of pensioners and declining numbers of people 
27 Accommodation, food, pocket money, basic toiletries, health care and the amount of 1.5 times 
the subsistence minimum for a person granted asylum.
28 M. Hlinčíková, G. Mesežnikov, Otvorená krajina alebo nedobytná pevnosť? Slovensko, migranti 
a utečenci, Praha 2016.
29 “Mortality and Life Expectancy Statistics”, Eurostat, http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explai 
ned/index.php/Mortality_and_life_expectancy_statistics [accessed: 25.01.2017]; “Total Fertility Rate”, 
Eurostat, http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/tgm/table.do?tab=table&init=1&language=en&pcode=tsdde220& 
plugin=1 [accessed: 25.01.2017].
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of reproductive age. Although migration is not the solution to this problem 
in the long term, it might at least be a solution for the upcoming years. The Slo-
vak economist Vladimír Baláž, from The Institute for Forecasting of the Slovak 
Academy of Sciences, even claims that Slovakia is “committing economic su-
icide” by preventing migrants from settling on our territory. According to his 
predictions, Slovakia would need between 10,000 to 15,000 new migrants to 
come to the country every year to preserve the current proportion of economi-
cally active citizens to retirees.30 Some companies are already hiring employees 
from Vietnam and other Asian countries to make up for the lack of workforce 
in Slovakia. Thus, integration into the economic market is becoming more and 
more necessary. It seems that, at least regarding Slovakia’s economic system, the 
issue with migrants and asylum seekers is not about choosing migrants who 
can enter the Slovak territory according to their ethnicity or religion (e.g., the 
Slovak government prefers Christians over Muslims), but according to their 
education, work experience and ability to integrate into the economic market 
according to the current demands of employers.31
4.2.4. Other Policies
As outlined in the following chapters, the attitude of Slovak political 
leaders, as well as that of the general public towards accepting third country mi-
grants in Slovakia is highly negative. Yet, this does not mean that the govern-
ment has not made any attempts to solve the crisis and help both migrants and 
the most burdened transit and receiving countries. A set of measures has been 
accepted to help deal with the migration crisis in general, which particularly 
reflects the priorities set up for Slovakia’s presidency of the EU Council in the 
second half of 2016.
Despite the quite negative image of Slovakia as a country of destination (not 
only) during the current crisis, the activities of the Slovak Republic aiming to 
help deal with this difficult situation should be mentioned: the Slovak Repu-
blic sent police units to assist at those state borders (those of EU member sta-
tes as well as those of third countries)32 most seriously affected by migration 
30 V. Baláž, “Pácha Slovensko demografickú samovraždu”, 20 January 2017, komentare.sme.sk, http://
komentare.sme.sk/c/8082740/pacha-slovensko-demograficku-samovrazdu.html [20.01.2017].
31 M. Hlinčíková, G. Mesežnikov, op. cit.
32 In October 2015 to Hungary (50 persons), in November 2015 to Slovenia (20 persons), in February 
2016 to Macedonia (25 persons), in October 2016 to Bulgaria (25 persons) and Serbia (15 persons); 
from October as apart of the European Coast Guard and Border Agency (“Do Slovinska zápasiaceho 
s vlnou migrantov odišli pomáhať slovenskí policajti”, 6 November 2015, Ministerstvo vnútra Slovenskej 
republiky, http://www.minv.sk/?tlacove-spravy-2&sprava=do-slovinska-zapasiaceho-s-vlnou-migrantov-
odisli-pomahat-slovenski-policajti [accessed: 16.09.2016]; “Štatistické údaje o štátnych hraniciach”, 
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flows; the Slovak government signed an agreement with the government of Au-
stria and re-opened the refugee facility in Gabčíkovo to accommodate asylum 
seekers from Austria during their asylum procedures. In cooperation with the 
civil society organization Pokoj a dobro [Peace and Good], the Slovak Republic 
also invited a group of 149 Christians from Iraq to stay permanently in Slova-
kia.33 One of the reactions of Slovak society to the migration and refugee cri-
sis was a petition called Výzva k ľudskosti (Plea for Humanity), which invited 
the Slovak government to support activities working towards the elimination 
of the crisis and to help refugees. Consequently, the Slovak government agreed 
to provide 500,000 EUR from the national TIPOS lottery for humanitarian 
projects implemented by civil society organizations. At the migration summit 
in September 2016, the Slovak Republic promised to provide 550 government 
scholarships for refugees until 2021.34
4.2.5. The Slovak Presidency of the EU Council
Slovakia’s position in the migration crisis was important because of the Slo-
vak Republic’s six-month presidency of the EU Council, beginning on 1 July 
2016. The presidency was the first that Slovakia had occupied since joining the 
EU in 2004. Among other responsibilities, the country presiding over the Co-
uncil is expected to coordinate and unify the activities of the Union as a who-
le. Yet, Slovakia was opposed to the generally accepted solutions agreed uponin 
the EU, which raised concerns among other member states as to how Slova-
kia would be able to fulfil this role. On the other hand, Slovakia itself was full 
of expectations stemming from its new position and the responsibilities con-
nected with this position. 
One of the first conceptual documents dealing with the priorities of the 
Slovak presidential programme, outlined in 2012, was called Preparing for 
the Slovak Presidency of the EU Council 2016 – Basic Data and Current Prio-
rities. The report proposed that the priorities of the presidency should reflect 
Slovak strategic interests, including cooperation with EU border states, both 
in Eastern Europe and in the Balkans, the enlargement of the EU and the 
Ministerstvo vnútra Slovenskej republiky, http://www.minv.sk/?statisticke-udaje-o-statnych-hraniciach 
[accessed: 16.09.2016]).
33 After one year, around two-thirds of all refugees from Iraq have stayed in Slovakia, while the others 
returned back home to safe areas. Mikušovič, D.,“Časť z asýrskych kresťanov, ktorí prišli na Slovensko 
z Iraku, sa vrátila domov”, 17 May 2016, DenníkN, https://dennikn.sk/462831/cast-asyrskych-krestanov-
ktori-prisli-slovensko-iraku-sa-vratila-domov/ [accessed: 20.01.2017].
34 “Lajčák: Pre utečencov poskytneme 550 vládnych štipendií”, 21 September 2016, SITA, http://
spravy.pravda.sk/domace/clanok/405682-lajcak-pre-utecencov-poskytneme-550-vladnych-stipendii/ 
[accessed: 8.12.2016].
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management of EU water resources – all topics which might have emphasized 
the particularities of Slovakia as the presiding country.35 Issues such as migration 
or border protection were absent, although Slovakia is located on the EU’s external 
borders. Paradoxically, these are the two main topics that Slovakia needed to deal 
with in 2016, only four years after the initial priorities had been formulated. 
The country’s representatives outlined four priorities for the Slovak presi-
dency: an economically strong Europe, a modern single market, sustainable 
migration and asylum policies and a globally engaged Europe. Regarding the 
migration-related priority, the main aim of the presidency was “...to encourage 
the Union to develop more sustainable migration and asylum policies”, as the 
current crisis “...is putting enormous pressure on the EU’s external borders and 
on the asylum systems of the Member States.”36 The Slovak Republic was wor-
king on several policies on European migration and asylum issues:37
1) The finalization of the legislative process for the proposals onthe Smart 
Borders Package of April 2015. The Entry-Exit System (EES), applied 
to non-EU nationals, travellers requiring visas and visa-exempt travel-
lers in the Schengen Area, will replace the obsolete system of paper 
passports and stamps with a more modern system of controlling third 
country citizens. It will do so by including biometric data, by provi-
ding information to border guards on refusals of entry of non-EU na-
tionals and by enabling refusals of entry and information on people 
overstaying their authorized stay to be checked electronically on the 
EES. Over the course of the Slovak presidency, the main principles 
of the package were agreed upon, as it was necessary to discuss the 
conditions that must be fulfilled if EU member states wanted access 
to information included in the EES.
2) The associated Regulation changing the Schengen Border Code was 
approved in December by the COREPER in reaction to the threat 
of foreign combatants coming to the EU. Its main aim was to intro-
duce the obligation for member states to systematically check eve-
ry person (including EU citizens) crossing the EU’s external borders 
on these particular databases. 
35 “Príprava predsedníctva Slovenskej republiky v Rade Európskej únie v roku 2016 – základné 
východiská a aktuálne priority”, Rokovanie vlády Slovenskej republiky, http://www.rokovania.sk/File.aspx/
ViewDocumentHtml/Mater-Dokum-146104?prefixFile=m_ [accessed: 5.12.2016].
36 “Priorities of the Slovak Presidency”, SK EU 2016, http://www.eu2016.sk/en/programme-and-
priorities/priorities-of-the-slovak-presidency [accessed: 5.12.2016].
37 A. Furik et al., “Predsedníctvo sa končí. V migrácii nepresvedčilo, výsledky má inde”, 13 Decem- 
ber 2016, EurActiv, https://euractiv.sk/fokus/slovenske-predsednictvo/slovenske-predsednictvo-sa-konci-
v-migracii-nepresvedcilo-vysledky-ma-inde/ [accessed: 20.12.2016].
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3) The creation of the European Coast Guard and Border Agency, provi-
ding the effective management of external migration flows to the EU. 
A draft of the regulation had been already been prepared during the 
Dutch presidency of the EU, with Slovakia taking on the finalization 
of the whole project and the introduction of its day-to-day running.
4) The presentation of the effective solidarity concept, which aimed to 
point out that mandatory quotas are not the only possible manifesta-
tion of solidarity with migrants, home countries and the most burde-
ned receiving countries. On the contrary, a complex solution demands 
a much more complex approach to solidarity, including not only relo-
cations, but also financial contributions, the sending of experts to the 
EU borders and Middle Eastern states, or the sharing of reception ca-
pacities – all of which were applied by the Slovak government (see re-
gional policies). However, the concept was heavily criticized, especial-
ly by Mediterranean countries, including Italy, Malta and Greece.
4.2.6. Slovakia’s Position on the Quota System
The Slovak Republic was strictly against the introduction of the quota sys-
tem for relocating migrants from Italy and Greece, which was passed by the 
Council of the European Union on 22 September 2015 – Council Decision 
(EU) 2015/1601. According to the proposed scheme, 120,000 migrants were 
to be relocated across the EU’s member states, making provisions for the size 
of the economy and population of each member state.38 Slovakia would be re-
quired to take 802 refugees – 190 from Italy and 612 from Greece. Out of the 
28 member states of the Union, the Czech Republic, Hungary and Romania 
were also against the quota system and Finland abstained in the ballot. Slova-
kia – under the then one-party SMER government - reacted by filing an action 
for annulment to the Court of Justice (case C-643/15), challenging the legality 
of the Asylum Seekers Relocation Decision of 22 September 2015.39 As the full 
text of the Slovak action is not accessible, it is only possible to analyse the six 
arguments published on the webpage of the Slovak Ministry of Justice. These 
can be simplified by dividing the Slovak argumentation into two groups:40
38 According to the Council’s decision, the migrants to be relocated are asylum seekers from Greece 
and Italy, not refugees. This means that they requested asylum in one of the three states, but that the 
asylum procedure has not yet concluded. This should be done in the states of relocation (Council Decision 
EU 2015/1601).
39 On 3 December 2015, Hungary also filed an action for annulment (case C-647/15).
40 Z. Vikarská, “The Slovak Challenge to the Asylum-Seekers’ Relocation Decision: A Balancing Act”, 
EU Law Analysis, http://eulawanalysis.blogspot.sk/2015/12/the-slovak-challenge-to-asylum-seekers.html 
[accessed:  5.12.2016].
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35 “Príprava predsedníctva Slovenskej republiky v Rade Európskej únie v roku 2016 – základné 
východiská a aktuálne priority”, Rokovanie vlády Slovenskej republiky, http://www.rokovania.sk/File.aspx/
ViewDocumentHtml/Mater-Dokum-146104?prefixFile=m_ [accessed: 5.12.2016].
36 “Priorities of the Slovak Presidency”, SK EU 2016, http://www.eu2016.sk/en/programme-and-
priorities/priorities-of-the-slovak-presidency [accessed: 5.12.2016].
37 A. Furik et al., “Predsedníctvo sa končí. V migrácii nepresvedčilo, výsledky má inde”, 13 Decem- 
ber 2016, EurActiv, https://euractiv.sk/fokus/slovenske-predsednictvo/slovenske-predsednictvo-sa-konci-
v-migracii-nepresvedcilo-vysledky-ma-inde/ [accessed: 20.12.2016].
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1) Legal arguments – referring particularly to procedural arguments 
concerning the way the contested decision was adopted. There are 
several claims to be taken into consideration regarding the adoption 
procedure of the contested legislation. To mention just a few: the de-
cision of the Council of the European Union (made up of national 
ministers) was adopted in contradiction to guidelines set by the Eu-
ropean Council (made up of heads of state and government) – altho-
ugh the conclusions of the European Council are only political in na-
ture and are not legally binding (Article 15(1) TEU). According to 
Article 15 TEU, the role of the European Council is to “define the 
general political directions and priorities” of the Union and, accor-
ding to Article 68 TFEU, also to “define the strategic guidelines for 
legislative and operational planning within the area of freedom, se-
curity and justice”. The European Council stated several times that 
the relocation of migrants 1) should be made on a voluntary basis 
and 2) should be a decision adopted by consensus.41 Another point re-
garding the decision adoption process includes repeated consultations 
with the European Parliament. The original draft concerned Hungary as 
well as Italy and Greece; the former refused to be included in the group 
of external border states in the final version of the contested decision. 
This is an essential change that should have been subject to another con-
sultation by the European Parliament. Thus, the breach of some essential 
principles of representative democracy and institutional balance in the 
EU, established in Article 78(3) TFEU and Article 293 TFEU, as well as 
Article 10(1 and 2) TEU and Article 13(2) TEU, can be objected to.
2) Political arguments – referring to the breach of the principle of pro-
portionality when the contested decision was adopted. As stated in 
the official statement of the Slovak Ministry of Justice, “The conte-
sted decision is manifestly incompatible with the principle of propor-
tionality, as it is manifestly neither suitable nor necessary to achieve 
the desired end.”42 In other words, the contested measure is “...not 
41 On 23 April 2015, the European Council stated that there was a need to “consider options for 
organizing emergency relocation between all member states on a voluntary basis” and to “set up a first 
voluntary pilot project on resettlement across the EU, offering places to persons qualifying for protection.” 
Furthermore, at its meeting of 25 and 26 June, the European Council agreed on “the temporary and 
exceptional relocation over two years from the frontline member states Italy and Greece to other member 
states of 40000 persons in clear need of international protection, in which all member states (except the 
UK) will participate,” as well as “the rapid adoption by the Council of a decision to this effect; to that end, 
all member states will agree by consensus by the end of July on the distribution of such persons, reflecting 
the specific situations of member states.” (Z. Vikarská, op. cit.).
42 “Summary of the Action”, Ministerstvo spravodlivosti Slovenskej republiky, http://www.justice.gov.sk 
/Stranky/aktualitadetail.aspx?announcementID=2038 [accessed: 10.12.2016].
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suitable to reach the desired aim (i.e., to relieve the burden borne by 
the external border states and to show solidarity and the fair sharing 
of responsibility between the member states as outlined in the decision’s 
preamble), since relocating people is too difficult and their further 
movement is too unpredictable.”43
4.3. Public Attitudes
According to the Migrant Integration Policy Index (MIPEX), Slovakia has 
only been characterized as a “very small country of net immigration (mostly 
non-EU) since the 2000s, driven by pre-crisis economic conditions and future 
demographic trends.” Slovakia scored 37 points, which means “slightly unfa-
vourable” towards immigrants, and is placed 34th out of 38 countries. Indeed, 
in 2013, Slovakia’s foreign population was only at 2.9%.44 With this number, 
Slovakia was the EU member state with the lowest number of immigrants per 
1,000 inhabitants.45
At the same time, Slovakia is a country with more anti-immigrant senti-
ment than the EU average.46 The attitude of Slovaks towards third country im-
migration to the state territory is generally negative and migration is conside-
red to be a serious threat to Slovak national security. Relevant conclusions can 
be derived from the Eurobarometer survey organized twice a year (in May and 
November) in every EU member state. The main aim of this survey is to get sta-
tistical data on the stance of EU citizens towards EU institutions, the direction 
of the EU as a whole and the prioritization of the current issues the EU has to 
face. For the purpose of the research on the attitudes of the Slovak people towards 
immigration, we compared the data from the Eurobarometer 83 (May 2015) 
and the Eurobarometer 85 (May 2016) by analysing the answers to the follo-
wing questions: 1) What do you think are the two most important issues fa-
cing our country at the moment? and 2) What do you think are the two most 
important issues facing the EU at the moment? In May 2015, migration was 
the most common answer to the first question for 4% of Slovak citizens and to 
43 Z. Vikarská, op. cit.
44 16% of the foreign-born population were originally non-EU nationals, and 62% of the foreign-
born population were from low or medium-developed countries, according to the Human Development 
Index (HDI).
45 “Foreign-born population by country of birth 1 January 2014”...
46 “Migrant Integration Policy Index 2015, ‘Slovakia’”, mipex.eu, http://www.mipex.eu/slovakia [ac- 
cessed: 20.10.2016].
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the second question for 35% of Slovak citizens. One year later, in May 2016, 
the figures in Slovakia had increased to 17% for the first question and to 59% 
for the second question.47
Since 2014, there have been numerous other surveys and polls organized 
by Slovak NGOs and news agencies investigating public opinion towards mi-
grants and the migration crisis. Although they might not be as representative 
and reliable as the Eurobarometer, the results of existing research in this area 
confirmed the negative image of Slovakia as a country with rather restrictive, 
non-inclusive policies, hostile and xenophobic public attitudes towards immi-
grants, a generally too conservative society and an intolerance of “otherness”.48 
In the 2muse agency poll from September 2015, 40% of respondents admit-
ted that migration is a topic that will influence their votes in the 2016 parlia-
mentary election.49 Another poll from the Polis agency from June 2015 showed 
that 70.1% of people are against the admission of third country migrants ba-
sed on mandatory quotas and 63.4% of them considered migration as a securi-
ty threat to the country.50 In September 2015, the Euroatlantic Centre (EAC) 
prepared a survey showing that refugees are regarded as the biggest security pro-
blem for Slovakia (34.3%), followed by unemployment (17.5%) and corrup-
tion (16.0%).51 Regarding policies for solving the migration crisis on the local 
and European level, most people (89%) agreed with the government’s solution 
to the crisis according to the FOCUS 2015 poll, and did not find the EU’s atti-
tude satisfactory (82.6%), as was noted by the EAC in September 2015.52 Even 
more interestingly, the Polis survey shows that in August 2015, 63.5% of re-
spondents saw the construction of the wall on the Hungarian-Serbian border in 
47 “Eurobarometer”, 15 December 2016, European Commission, http://ec.europa.eu/COMMFront 
Office/PublicOpinion/index.cfm/Survey/getSurveyDetail/instruments/STANDARD/surveyKy/2130 
[accessed: 15.12.2016].
48 M. Vašečka, Postoje verejnosti k cudzincom a zahraničnej migrácii v Slovenskej Republike, Bratislava, 
IOM Medzinárodná organizácia pre migráciu, 2009; J. Filadelfiová, M. Hlinčíková, “Diskusia o kul- 
túrnej diverzite a migrácii: trendy a výzvy pre verejnú politiku”, [in:] J. Filadelfiová et al., Sondy do kul- 
túrnej diverzity na Slovensku, Bratislava, Inštitút pre verejné otázky, 2010.
49 “Slováci nechcú, aby v SR utečenci našli druhý domov”, 16 September 2015, noviny.sk, https://www.
noviny.sk/slovensko/151793-slovaci-nechcu-aby-utecenci-nasli-na-svk-druhy-domov [accessed: 25.01.2017].
50 “Prieskum: Slováci odmietajú prijať utečencov, vidia v nich hrozbu”, 17 June 2015, pravda.sk, 
http://spravy.pravda.sk/domace/clanok/358731-slovensko-by-nemalo-prijat-utecencov-mysli-si-70-
percent-respondentov/ [accessed: 25.01.2017].
51 “Najväčším spoločenským problémom sú momentálne utečenci”, 23 September 2015, netky.sk, 
http://www.netky.sk/clanok/najvacsim-spolocenskym-problemom-su-momentalne-utecenci [accessed: 
25.01.2017].
52 L. Krbatová, “Bezpečnosť hlása už aj opozícia”, 4 January 2016, sme.sk, https://domov.sme.sk/
c/20070306/bezpecnost-hlasa-uz-aj-opozicia.html [accessed: 25.01.2017]; “Prieskum: Slováci sú nespokojní 
s postojom Bruselu k utečencom”, 16 September 2015, pravda.sk,http://spravy.pravda.sk/domace/clanok 
/367772-prieskum-slovaci-su-nespokojni-s-postojom-bruselu-k-utecencom/ [accessed: 25.01.2017].
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a positive light.53 The Institute for Sociology at the Slovak Academy of Sciences 
noticed a certain paradox in perceptions of the migration crisis in Slovakia. 
Although 70% of respondents feared migrants, only 7.1% believed Slova- 
kia to be the final destination where they want to settle. This combination 
of quite realistic assumptions relating to the settlement intentions of third co-
untry migrants and a high level of fear of newcomers is complemented by a re-
latively low level of their readiness to help. When answering the question “How 
should Europeans treat migrants already present on European territory?”, 49% 
of respondents answered “help only where necessary”, 19.4% answered “not help 
at all” and only 1.5% “help more intensively”.54
Another important manifestation of the public’s attitude was the referen-
dum held in August 2015 in Gabčíkovo (Western Slovakia), following a pe-
tition reacting to the Slovak-Austrian agreement on the temporary resettle-
ment of 500 asylum seekers from Austria to the Slovak Republic. The local 
people were asked: “Are you against the establishment of the temporary refu-
gee camp on the premises of the Slovak technical university in Gabčíkovo?” 
58.47% of qualified voters participated in the referendum and 96.67% of them 
were against the establishment of the premises.55 However, the referendum was 
not legally binding and the facility was created despite the general disagreement.
Resulting from the generally negative attitude towards third country mi-
grants, the issue of political extremism in Slovakia became more visible in 
the country after 2014, although extremism is hardly connected solely with 
the concept of migration. There are several other factors, including problems 
with the Roma population, the state’s economic situation or corruption scan-
dals and the public’s general mistrust of the established political leaders, which 
also explain the rise in the popularity of extremist political parties in the 2016 
election. However, the topic of migration has been a strong tool in the hands 
of extremists and radical political leaders, as has been seen in their speeches and 
the presentation of their ideas. Migration discourse is closely connected to na-
tional identities and the issue of self-determination. Yet, in Slovakia, migration 
is a relatively new phenomenon. Migrants coming to the state before 1989 were 
mostly people who had been officially admitted by the national government, 
53 “Prieskum: Ľuďom sa pozdáva maďarský plot proti utečencom”, 29 August 2015, netky.sk, http://www.
netky.sk/clanok/prieskum-ludom-sa-pozdava-madarsky-plot-proti-utecencom [accessed: 25.01.2017].
54 M. Bahna, R. Klobucký, “Slovenská verejnosť a utečenci v decembri 2015”, 2015, http://www.
sociologia.sav.sk/cms/uploaded/2297_attach_tlacova_sprava_SU_SAV21122015.pdf [accessed: 5.01.2017].
55 Proponents of the refugee facility claimed, among other things, that there had been refugees living 
in the town in the past during the Balkan conflict in the 1990s, and that their coexistence with locals was 
peaceful and unproblematic (M. Hlinčíková, G. Mesežnikov, op. cit.).
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a positive light.53 The Institute for Sociology at the Slovak Academy of Sciences 
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netky.sk/clanok/prieskum-ludom-sa-pozdava-madarsky-plot-proti-utecencom [accessed: 25.01.2017].
54 M. Bahna, R. Klobucký, “Slovenská verejnosť a utečenci v decembri 2015”, 2015, http://www.
sociologia.sav.sk/cms/uploaded/2297_attach_tlacova_sprava_SU_SAV21122015.pdf [accessed: 5.01.2017].
55 Proponents of the refugee facility claimed, among other things, that there had been refugees living 
in the town in the past during the Balkan conflict in the 1990s, and that their coexistence with locals was 
peaceful and unproblematic (M. Hlinčíková, G. Mesežnikov, op. cit.).
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usually foreign students from politically friendly Communist third countries 
and workers from Vietnam. Migrant numbers were generally low and control-
led by the official authorities, thus they were considered invisible and unpro-
blematic. After the fall of the socialist regime in Eastern and Central Europe, 
nationalist sentiments were revived on the political scene. The established “sys-
temic vacuum” following the collapse of Communist regimes was filled by the 
capitalist market economy. As a consequence, national chauvinism acted as a 
‘shock-absorber’ against the sudden exposure to the imbalance created by the 
new capitalistic regime.56 The other theory explains the revival of nationalist 
sentiments in Slovakia and the Eastern Europe as a reaction to the processes 
of globalization. Globalization is sometimes referred to as a process of the remo-
val of national borders, the diffusion of cultures and the dissolution of national 
states. However, Slovakia gained its state sovereignty less than 25 years ago and 
the Slovak nationality is, for many citizens, one of the country’s most important 
values. “In this situation, most political subjects identify the citizens as national-
ly sentient and take this into account in their political programmes and activi-
ties.”57 Therefore, it is difficult to setup strict boundaries between constitutional-
ly formed nationalism and its escalated form – right-wing extremism.58
Bolečeková and Androvičová59 identify the following areas for the possible 
origins of the generally negative attitude of Slovak people towards migration: 
psychological, historical and socio-political. It needs to be stressed that all cau-
ses of the situation are interconnected and that the current situation in Slova-
kia is very likely “predestined” by a combination of all of the three factors men-
tioned above. Vašečka60 claims that the process of national self-determination 
in Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries has been more ethnic and 
culturally driven than civic and territorial: “The salience of the ethnic compo-
nent in constructing nationhood among CEE countries is, seemingly, the cri-
tical factor in why these states are not ready to fully accept the cultural other 
as equal members – the other may be national minorities or new immigrant 
groups.”61 The author expresses the view that post-modern CEE nations should 
56 J. Androvičová, “Immigration in Current Political Discourse – The Case of Slovakia within the 
European Union”, Annual of Language and Politics and Politics of Identity, 2013, Vol. 7, No. 1, http://
alppi.vedeckecasopisy.cz/publicFiles/00531.pdf [accessed: 20.11.2016].
57 A. Mikulčíková, “Pravicový extrémizmus – vec verejná”, [in:] IMEA, Liberec, 2008, pp. 674–686.
58 Ibidem.
59 M. Bolečeková, J. Androvičová, “The Slovak Attitudes towards Immigrants in the Context of the 
Current Refugee and Migration Crisis”, Chorzowskie Studia Polityczne, 2015, No. 10, pp. 241–258.
60 M. Vašečka, “Nationalized Citizenship in Central European Countries”, [in:] Nation über alles: 
Processes of Redefinition and Reconstruction of the Term Nation in Central Europe, ed. M. Vašečka, Centre 
for the Research of Ethnicity and Culture, pp. 199–215.
61Ibidem, p. 7.
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re-define their ethicized identities to identities shaped by constitutional patrio-
tism, democratic values, human rights and the rule of law. Another issue is the 
lack of relevant information for people to draw on. The media prefer to publish 
sensations – mostly, stories about terror attacks organized by Muslim fighters 
who came within the migration waves or the misery of temporary facilities for 
migrants. Politicians, on the other hand, often use migration in their campaign 
by fashioning all migrants as solely economic migrants who will depend on the 
state’s social system, taking jobs from locals and burdening the economy.
4.4. Political Implications
Although Slovakia is not a first choice destination for migrants from 
third countries, discussions about EU quotas raised questions over the stay of 
third country migrants in Slovakia. An intensification of the political debate on 
migrants and refugees has been identified, especially in the months preceding 
the Slovak parliamentary election that took place in March 2016; this raises qu-
estions over the potential misuse of the topic and its securitization based on the 
generally negative attitudes of the Slovak people towards accepting third coun-
try migrants on the Slovak territory.
The main aim of this chapter is to analyse the position of the current parlia-
mentary political parties on the issue of third country migrants coming to Slo-
vakia. The analysis is based on the parties’ pre-election programmes as its main 
source of information, following their similarities and complexity in compari-
son with the floating and unstable opinions presented by particular politicians 
in their public speeches and media appearances.
Slovakia has a proportional voting system, with an election being held every 
four years. Therefore, there are traditionally many parties running for election. 
The most exploited topics presented by politicians before every parliamentary 
election in Slovakia include social care and employment, the anti-corruption 
agenda, the education system and public health. However, the last parliamen-
tary election in 2016 brought another topic to the fore over all of the others 
– the migration of third country nationals to the European Union. This regio-
nal problem with a global impact significantly affects the position of the Slo-
vak Republic on the regional (V4) and European (EU) levels, while also having 
significant implications for new perceptions of the promotion of the national 
interests of the Slovak Republic in the eyes of its European allies.62 As noted 
62 P. Terem, M. Lenč, “Význam spojeneckých väzieb a súčasné smerovanie európskej zahraničnej 
politiky Slovenskej republiky”, [in:] Medzinárodné vzťahy 2015. Aktuálne otázky svetovej ekonomiky 
a politiky. Zborník príspevkov zo 16. medzinárodnej vedeckej konferencie, Bratislava 2015, pp. 674–686.
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by Androvičová,63 in Western democracies considered as traditional immigra-
tion countries, migration has always been a topic with significant potential for 
electoral mobilization. Moreover, anti-immigration rhetoric is becoming a tool 
for attracting supporters of extreme-right oriented political parties. In Slovakia, 
political discourse on migration from third countries change in its context and 
form from May 2015, reflecting the upcoming parliamentary election on the one 
hand and increasingly negative public opinion on the issue on the other. Thus, 
political discourse changed to an electoral discourse, while migration, which was 
previously presented as an EU problem, has become the most burning threat to 
national security in the electoral campaigns of most political parties.64
Generally speaking, all of the political parties in Slovakia agreed in their bro-
adly negative attitude towards the receiving of third country migrants in Slo-
vakia on a compulsory basis. Such unity over political issues is a rare occurren-
ce in Slovakia. Yet, the proposed measures on how to settle the crisis and deal 
with asylum seekers differed according to the parties’ left-right orientation on 
the political spectrum and to their political agenda.65 In the following text, the 
pre-election attitudes of the current Slovak parliamentary political parties will 
be presented, according to their official stands towards migration as published 
in their official party documents.66
SMER – sociálna demokracia [Direction – Social Democracy] – is curren-
tly the only markedly leftist political party in the Parliament and as such, it is 
expected to advocate for minority rights and to put immigration high on its 
agenda. SMER-SD is the biggest parliamentary party in Slovakia and the win-
ner of the 2016 election. Yet, it has a generally negative attitude towards third 
country migration in the long run. Already in 2012, the party depicted mi-
gration as an unfavourable demographic development among other problems 
such as global economic changes or climate change.67 In its electoral campaign 
63 J. Androvičová, “Sekuritizácia migrantov na Slovensku – analýza diskurzu”, Sociológia, 2015, 
Vol. 47, No. 4, https://www.sav.sk/journals/uploads/08190914Androvicova%20-%20OK.pdf [accessed: 
20.11.2016].
64 V. Žúborová, “The Context and Content on Migration: Political Discourse in Slovak Republic”, 
[in:] 3rd International Multidisciplinary Scientific Conference on Social Sciences & Arts SGEM 2016, 
Conference Proceedings, Book 2, Political Sciences, Law, Finance, Economics & Tourism, Vol. I, Sofia 2016, 
pp. 607–612.
65 In this text, we derive the differences between the left and right side of the political spectrum mostly 
from the factor of class. Whereas the Left promotes social justice and redistributive economic policies, 
the Right defends private property and capitalism. Other differences include attitudes to personal liberty, 
human rights, social freedoms, etc. The general classification of the political parties on the left-right 
spectrum is usually as follows: communist, socialist, green, liberal, Christian democratic, conservative, 
right-wing extremist.
66 The parties’ positions are presented according to their 2016 parliamentary election results 
in top-down order.
67 “Programové zameranie strany SMER-SD pre volebné obdobie 2012–2016”, Strana SMER-SD, 
http://strana-smer.sk/sites/default/files/uploads/dokumenty/programove_zameranie_2012–2016.doc 
[accessed: 20.11.2016].
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in 2016, the party proposed a set of long-term solutions to the crisis, including 
the more consistent protection of the external borders of the Schengen Area, 
the stabilization of the situation in countries of origin and the establishment 
of the so-called secure place, in which migrants would be grouped and registe-
red in order to sort economic migrants from refugees eligible for asylum in one 
of the Union’s member states.68 The original slogan of the campaign, Robíme 
pre Slovensko [We work for the people] was later complemented by Chránime 
Slovensko [We protect Slovakia], thus indirectly implicating the migration cri-
sis. The party strongly opposed the quota system. One has to wonder the extent 
to which the strict stance of the then Slovak one-party SMER government on 
migration and the legal action of the Court was influenced by the upcoming 
election and attempts to increase the party’s popularity, and whether the reac-
tion would have been the same had the contested decision been adopted a few 
months earlier or later, after the election in Slovakia.
SaS – Sloboda a solidarita [Freedom and Solidarity] is the biggest opposi-
tion party in the 2016 Slovak parliament, is considered as a liberal party on the 
right site of the political spectrum and is a member of the Eurosceptic ACRE 
– the Alliance of Conservatives and Reformists in Europe. In the 2016 elec-
toral program, SaS included the migration issue in the part of its programme 
dealing with Interior and Defence, where it is stated that it is right to support 
victims of war and their families, but that solidarity cannot be enforced. More-
over, the programme emphasized the stricter protection of Slovak borders and 
stated that every country has the right to decide on who can live on its terri-
tory, and under what circumstances. The party came up with a five-point plan 
to tackle the EU migration crisis. It is interesting to draw attention to the five-
point plan’s introductory remarks, stressing that the plan was prepared to make 
provisions for the wishes of the citizens of the Slovak Republic. The proposed 
solutions include:69
1) Protection of the external border of the EU and the Schengen Area. 
This is seen as the crucial point, as freedom of movement within the EU 
is based on the fact that its external borders are protected precisely. 
2) Establishment of two central migration camps for asylum seekers out-
side of the EU – one in North Africa and another in the Balkan region 
or Turkey. The camps should be financed by the EU and the main 
aim of their existence would be the proper separatethose eligible for 
68 D. Kubíčková, “The Positions of Political Parties in Slovakia in the Context of Migration”, 
[in:] 3rd International Multidisciplinary Scientific Conference..., pp. 665–671.
69 “Pozícia SaS pri riešení migračnej krízy”, Strana SaS, http://www.strana-sas.sk/pozicia-sas-pri-
rieseni-migracnej-krizy/3962 [accessed: 5.12.2016].
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asylum in the EU from those who are solely economic migrants. This 
separation should take place before the migrants enter the EU itself.
3) Stabilization of the situation in Syria, Iraq and Libya, so that 
the primary cause of emigration from these states is eliminated. 
The EU should cooperate in this endeavour alongside the USA, Russia, 
Turkey and other rich Gulf states, including Saudi Arabia and the 
United Arab Emirates.
4) Movement of all illegal migrants from EU territory to central refugee 
camps, where they can either apply for asylum or leave the camp and 
return to their home country or another state willing to accept them.
5) Rejection of a mandatory quota system for refugees.
OĽaNO-NOVA – Obyčajní ľudia a nezávislé osobnosti – Nová väčšina 
[Ordinary People and Independent Personalities – New Majority] is someti-
mes referred to as a niche party70 composed of independent personalities, and 
its attitude towards migration has to be considered in this context. The topics 
of migration and refugees were mentioned in the short blueprint paper Treaty 
with Slovakia from November 2015, in which the party proposed that, over the 
course of Slovakia’s presidency of the Council of the EU, the country should 
enforce the exclusion of those states from the Schengen Area that fail to pro-
tect the Area’s external borders.71 Furthermore, the party proposed eight points 
which would help to solve the EU migration crisis:72
1) To consistently distinguish between refugees and asylum seekers.
2) To reject mandatory quotas on asylum seekers which go against to the 
Union’s principle of solidarity and subsidiarity.
70 The concept of niche parties is an intuitive one. There are many influential scholars 
(B. Meguid, “Competition between Unequals: The Role of Mainstream Party Strategy in Niche Party 
Success”, American Political Science Review, 2005, Vol. 99, No. 3, http://notecrom.com/content/
files/695/file.pdf [accessed: 5.11.2016]; J. Adams et al., “Are Niche Parties Fundamentally Different from 
Mainstream Parties? The Causes and the Electoral Consequences of Western European Parties’ Policy 
Shifts 1976–1998”, American Journal of Political Science, 2006, Vol. 50, No. 3, pp. 513–529) who are 
trying to define certain features of niche parties that differentiate them from the political mainstream. 
Basically, these features include a vague political program, focus on a small range of topics, a disregard for 
economic issues and organizational and motivational differences. The latter means that they are more likely 
to be activist-dominated and policy-seeking. As noted by Wagner (M. Wagner, “Niche Parties”, http://
www.wagnermarkus.net/niche-parties.html [accessed: 25.11.2016]), niche parties in (Western) European 
party systems can (but do not have to) include the Greens, radical-right parties as well as communist and 
regionalist parties that differ from the mainstream parties – social democrats and Christian democrats.
71 “Hnutie obyčajní ľudia a nezávislé osobnosti, ‘Zmluva so Slovenskom’”, http://www.obycajniludia.
sk/wp-content/uploads/Obycajne-noviny_2015_47.pdf [accessed: 25.01.2017].
72 “Hnutie obyčajní ľudia a nezávislé osobnosti, ‘Návrh Vyhlásenia NR SR v súvislosti s riešením 
migračnej krízy’”, old.obycajniludia.sk, http://old.obycajniludia.sk/navrh-vyhlasenia-nr-sr-v-suvislosti-s-
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3) To provide assistance to refugees fleeing from their home countries 
in fear of persecution and war. This has to be done on a voluntary 
basis, while still realizing our moral responsibility to help these people.
4) To offer assistance to refugees – particularly to families, women and 
children from the most endangered religious groups in Syria and Iraq, 
in cooperation with Slovakian NGOs and churches.
5) To propose an amendment of the Asylum Act no. 480/2002 Coll., 
allowing for the withdrawal of asylum in the case of a crime being 
committed.
6) To tighten up the screening of asylum seekers over the course of the 
asylum procedure in order to minimize potential risks for the security 
of the Slovak Republic and its citizens.
7) At the meeting of the European Council and the Council of Ministers 
of the EU:
a) To initiate the activation of a mechanism for evaluating countries 
which breach the Schengen rules for the protection of the EU’s 
external borders on a long-term basis;
b) To insist on the creation of a concrete and effective mechanism for the 
return and readmission of economic migrants to their home countries;
c) To propose a declaration of the European Council comprising a mes-
sage that all economic migrants will be returned to their home coun-
tries, to prevent another migration wave from coming to Europe.
8) To approve humanitarian aid to Turkey, Jordan and Lebanon – states 
hosting the highest amounts of refugees and asylum seekers.
Next, there is SNS – Slovenská národná strana [Slovak National Party]. 
Classifying this party within the political spectrum is quite challenging,73 as 
it advocates elements of both left- and right-wing policies – depending on the 
current political leadership. The party’s agenda has traditionally been focused 
on all foreign elements in society, including the Hungarian minority in Slova-
kia and, in particular, the Roma issue. The party mentions the topic of third 
country migration in its electoral programme, in the part dealing with state 
national sovereignty. Its main point is the protection of Slovakia’s borders from 
“...the uncontrollable invasion of illegal migrants...” Besides, the defence of 
Slovak ethnic, cultural, religious and social integrity, which is potentially being 
endangered by immigrants, is also outlined. The rejection of multiculturalism 
73 L. Billý, “Immigration Issues in Slovak Politics”, Contemporary European Studies, 2012, Vol. 7, No. 1, 
http://www.ces.upol.cz/wp-content/uploads/2014/12/ces1_12_billy.pdf [accessed: 15.11.2016].
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asylum in the EU from those who are solely economic migrants. This 
separation should take place before the migrants enter the EU itself.
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United Arab Emirates.
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and the protection of traditional Christian values is further highlighted in the 
party’s Popradské memorandum.74
Kotleba – Ľudová strana Naše Slovensko [Kotleba – People’s Party Our Slo-
vakia] is a radical right-wing party and does not have any particular program-
me for resolving the migration crisis. According to the party’s official program-
me, all migrants are seen as Muslims and the party treats them as a danger to 
the physical security of the Slovak population, especially women. It also deems 
them to be a threat to Slovak cultural identity and a burden on the Slovak eco-
nomy. The party rejects the obligatory quota, emphasizing that each migrant 
granted asylum in Slovakia costs the state about 1,500 EUR per month, without 
any further reference to the source of this calculation.75
SME RODINA – Boris Kolláris a party that has presented its attitude to-
wards the EU migration crisis in its electoral programme. This takes a question-
answer format and is divided into four categories – economy, education system, 
public health and security. The first thing of note is that the only topic analysed 
in the security category is migration, as if Slovakia had no other security issues 
to face over the next four years. The party views migrants and asylum seekers as 
Slovakia’s biggest security problem. The current migration waves are compared 
to the Migration Period of the Barbarian nations, which led to the fall of the 
Roman Empire. According to the party’s program, some migrants are certain-
ly highly educated people from whom our society can benefit. However, most 
of them are also members of ISIS and come to Europe with the aim of com-
pletely destroying our society. Thus, Slovakia has to reject mandatory quotas, 
consistently separate economic migrants from asylum seekers and only accept 
Christian migrants, as only these people are able to integrate successfully into 
Slovak society.76
Most-Híd is one of the few parties that do not directly refer to migration 
as a security threat. The party avoids creating a direct connection between im-
migrants and terrorists, which might cause the spread of fear, racism and xe-
nophobia in society. This attitude results from the portfolio of the party itself 
– Most-Híd is a party whose policies are mostly oriented around minorities li-
ving in Slovakia.77 Migration is not a dominant topic in their pre-election cam-
74 “Slovenská národná strana, ‘Volebný program pre silný štát”, sns.sk, http://www.sns.sk/engine/assets 
/uploads/2016/01/volebny_program_2016.pdf [accessed: 25.11.2016].
75 “Kotleba – Ľudová strana Naše Slovensko, ‘10 bodov za naše Slovensko’”, http://www.naseslovensko.
net/wp-content/uploads/2015/01/Volebn%C3%BD-program-2016.pdf [accessed: 12.11.2016].
76 “Volebný program Hnutia SME Rodina – Boris Kollár”, Hnutie SME Rodina – Boris Kollár, http://
www.hnutiesmerodina.sk/volebny-program.php [accessed: 26.11.2016].
77 “Vyhlásenie Predsedníctva Most-Híd k migrantskej kríze”, Most-Híd, http://www.most-hid.sk/sk/
vyhlasenie-predsednictva-most-hid-k-migrantskej-krize [accessed: 30.10.2016].
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paign. The term third country migration does not appear even once in the party’s 
programme for the period 2016–2020.
Sieť [Network] does not include the migration crisis as a fundamental topic 
in its 2016 electoral campaign either, and does not mention migration in its 
electoral programme. The party encouraged the President of the Slovak Repu-
blic to organize a round table of the relevant Slovak political parties in order to 
reach an agreement on Slovakia’s stance on the current situation.
As we have seen from the above analysis of the pre-election programmes 
of Slovak political parties, all of them reject mandatory quotas as proposed by 
the European Union. Most of the parties propose a long-term solution based 
on the settlement of the situation in the regions from which the immigrants 
are coming in the Middle East and the proper separation of economic migrants 
from asylum seekers. Another common feature is the securitization of migra-
tion in Slovakia, which is apparent when references are made to migration as the 
biggest security problem of Slovakia (e.g., the SME Rodina party). Although 
most political parties are united in their stance towards the migration crisis re-
gardless of whether they are members of the coalition or the opposition, the-
re are several lines of conflict separating the state’s current political elites. The 
governmental program for 2016–2020 mentions migration only four times 
– mostly within the context of security. The government of the Slovak Republic 
is ready to support constructive solutions of the current migration crisis, albe-
it while “...respecting the specifics and possibilities of the particular member 
states”.78 Moreover, irregular migration is referred to as an asymmetric security 
threat, similar to terrorism and organized crime. On the other hand, the prag-
matic and somehow securitization-based stance of the government is balanced 
by more the idealistic position of the President of the Slovak Republic, who 
also rejects mandatory quotas, but continues to stress the moral obligations 
of European governments and their people towards migrants in need.
Obviously, in Slovakia most political parties take negative a stance on mi-
gration, regardless of their left-right orientation on the political spectrum. 
As noted by Androvičová,79 in the former immigration countries, such as Ger-
many, France or Sweden, the social democratic parties usually represent a more 
moderate approach to migration based on such values as respect for human ri-
ghts, tolerance and anti-racism. On the other hand, the conservative and right 
side of the political spectrum is about to take a more securitization-based stan-
ce according to programmes based on the principles of nationalism and the 
78 “Programové vyhlásenie vlády”, Vláda SR, http://www.vlada.gov.sk/data/files/6483_programove-
vyhlasenie-vlady-slovenskej-republiky.pdf [accessed: 10.12.2016].
79 J. Androvičová, 2013, op. cit.
220
and the protection of traditional Christian values is further highlighted in the 
party’s Popradské memorandum.74
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net/wp-content/uploads/2015/01/Volebn%C3%BD-program-2016.pdf [accessed: 12.11.2016].
76 “Volebný program Hnutia SME Rodina – Boris Kollár”, Hnutie SME Rodina – Boris Kollár, http://
www.hnutiesmerodina.sk/volebny-program.php [accessed: 26.11.2016].
77 “Vyhlásenie Predsedníctva Most-Híd k migrantskej kríze”, Most-Híd, http://www.most-hid.sk/sk/
vyhlasenie-predsednictva-most-hid-k-migrantskej-krize [accessed: 30.10.2016].
221
paign. The term third country migration does not appear even once in the party’s 
programme for the period 2016–2020.
Sieť [Network] does not include the migration crisis as a fundamental topic 
in its 2016 electoral campaign either, and does not mention migration in its 
electoral programme. The party encouraged the President of the Slovak Repu-
blic to organize a round table of the relevant Slovak political parties in order to 
reach an agreement on Slovakia’s stance on the current situation.
As we have seen from the above analysis of the pre-election programmes 
of Slovak political parties, all of them reject mandatory quotas as proposed by 
the European Union. Most of the parties propose a long-term solution based 
on the settlement of the situation in the regions from which the immigrants 
are coming in the Middle East and the proper separation of economic migrants 
from asylum seekers. Another common feature is the securitization of migra-
tion in Slovakia, which is apparent when references are made to migration as the 
biggest security problem of Slovakia (e.g., the SME Rodina party). Although 
most political parties are united in their stance towards the migration crisis re-
gardless of whether they are members of the coalition or the opposition, the-
re are several lines of conflict separating the state’s current political elites. The 
governmental program for 2016–2020 mentions migration only four times 
– mostly within the context of security. The government of the Slovak Republic 
is ready to support constructive solutions of the current migration crisis, albe-
it while “...respecting the specifics and possibilities of the particular member 
states”.78 Moreover, irregular migration is referred to as an asymmetric security 
threat, similar to terrorism and organized crime. On the other hand, the prag-
matic and somehow securitization-based stance of the government is balanced 
by more the idealistic position of the President of the Slovak Republic, who 
also rejects mandatory quotas, but continues to stress the moral obligations 
of European governments and their people towards migrants in need.
Obviously, in Slovakia most political parties take negative a stance on mi-
gration, regardless of their left-right orientation on the political spectrum. 
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protection of traditional cultural values that might be put at risk by newcomers 
from foreign cultural and socio-economic environments. However, as can be 
seen from the analysis of the political parties’ electoral programmes, this is not the 
case in Slovakia. To give only one example, the Slovak SMER-SD party’s appro-
ach to migration is more conservative and nationalistic than liberal and socially-
oriented, even though the party is considered to be social-democratic. Generally, 
we can define three determinants influencing parties’ position on migration.
1) Ideological determinants – most notably visible in the approach of the 
Slovak National Party and Most-Híd. The SNS’s political profile has 
traditionally been based on ethnic nationalism. In the past, political 
clashes with parties representing the Hungarian minority have been 
quite common. Therefore, it is not surprising that migrants from dif-
ferent cultural, ethnic and religious backgrounds are also deemed as 
a threat to national sovereignty and Slovak ethnic, cultural, religious 
and social integrity. On the other hand, Most-Híd, as a party advo-
cating for the rights of minorities in the state, adopted a much more 
tolerant and less radical stance.
2) Strategic determinants – understood as the exploitation of migration 
for political gain. As noted in the previous chapter, the general public 
attitude towards migration combines elements of fear and rejection, 
including demands for border protection and security. The parties 
need to reflect these requirements of their voters in order to succeed 
in the parliamentary election.
3) Structural determinants – especially the institutional structure of the 
party system. These determinants provide for the manner in which par-
ty policy is formed in Slovakia. According to Mihálik and Jankoľa,80 
the political orientation of Slovak parties is highly dependent on the 
current party leadership.81 Modern-day governance in many countries 
is usually structured along the lines of leadership roles, i.e., the im-
80 J. Mihálik, M. Jankoľa, “Positions, Polarization and Conflict Management of Slovak Political 
Parties”, Baltic Journal of Law & Politics, 2016, Vol. 9, No. 1, https://www.degruyter.com/downloadpdf/j/
bjlp.2016.9.issue-1/bjlp-2016-0001/bjlp-2016-0001.xml [accessed: 2.11.2016].
81 The concept of leadership has been analysed by many scholars. Among the most important are 
Barbara Kellerman and Jean Blondel, who argues that leadership is a concept according to which leader 
and followers are interrelated in a specific context and which offers a typology in leadership studies: 
a) leadership as a social status – position; b) leadership in types of social structures; c) leadership 
in organizational functions and institutional positions; d) leadership as a personality type. Another 
important study of leadership has been conducted by Max Weber, who defines three kinds of authority 
and legitimacy in political leadership: legal, charismatic and traditional (J. Mihálik, M. Jankoľa, op. cit.; 
M. Weber, Political Writings, Cambridge 1994).
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portance of presidents of states, prime ministers and, finally, political 
party leaders. Leaders are the party members most visible in the me-
dia and, at the same time, those who most attract voters. Therefore, 
they also play major role in political decision-making and crisis ma-
nagement over the course of the electoral campaigns. Furthermore, 
“...the party affiliation or polarization is best interpreted through the 
personality of its leader. In other words, party leaders enjoy the most 
visibility in the public media and thus create the party’s complete po-
litical image for society as well as for other political parties and mo-
vements.”82 As suggested by McAllister,83 this feature is visible in the 
Slovak political environment in such a way that Slovak governments 
are usually named after the current Prime Minister (The Fico Go-
vernment, The Radičová Government), compared to political parties 
formed through a government coalition (i.e., in Germany – the CDU 
/CSU-SPD government, etc.). Thus, the interests and personality of 
the party’s leader often play a more important role in conflict mana-
gement than the official policy lines of the party itself. In some cases 
– as shown by the migration crisis – they can even be in complete op-
position to one another. An example is the already mentioned party, 
Smer-SD. “Ideologically, its tems from the left-wing socialist party fa-
mily, but its leaders strongly refuse solidarity with migrants, which is 
mainly demonstrated through the definite rejection of the quota sys-
tem and the distribution of migrants. In conflict management, the 
party leadership stands for typically right-wing solutions; thus, the 
social aspect of the party is substituted with national protection and 
interests.”84 Another example would be the liberal platform, Freedom 
and Solidarity (SAS). Despite its name, the party strongly opposes so-
lidarity with migrants and the party leadership considers the migra-
tion influx to be an economic and social threat to the EU. Thus, in 
the case of several Slovak political parties, ideology plays only a limi-
ted role in the conflict management of migration flows in the Europe-
an Union, and party leadership seems to be the crucial factor in party 
orientation and decision-making in the crisis.
82 J. Mihálik, M. Jankoľa, op. cit., p. 9.
83 I. McAllister, “The Personalization of Politics”, [in:] The Oxford Handbook of Political Behavior, 
Oxford 2007, pp. 571–588.
84 J. Mihálik, M. Jankoľa, op. cit., p. 10.
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82 J. Mihálik, M. Jankoľa, op. cit., p. 9.
83 I. McAllister, “The Personalization of Politics”, [in:] The Oxford Handbook of Political Behavior, 
Oxford 2007, pp. 571–588.
84 J. Mihálik, M. Jankoľa, op. cit., p. 10.
224
4.5. Conclusions
In the Slovak Republic, the influence of the migration and refugee crisis 
has been markedly less intense than in its neighbouring countries of Hunga-
ry and Austria. The main reason for this is definitely the geographical location 
of and probably also the socio-economic situation in Slovakia. In opposition to 
Hungary, the Slovak Republic is not situated on the most frequent migratory 
routes; and unlike Austria, Slovakia is a rather unattractive country for immi-
grants. Despite its relatively low numbers of immigrants, the current migration 
crisis has become one of the central issues influencing all aspects of society in 
Slovakia. Despite the fact that there have only been 186 accepted asylum se-
ekers in Slovakia since the breakout of the crisis in 2014, and that the number 
of international protection applicants was 10 times lower in 2016 than in it 
was in 2004 when Slovakia joined the EU, third country migration has still had 
a significant impact on the public, causing a battle of wills between the minori-
ty who support the acceptance of asylum seekers and the majority fearing the-
se newcomers from different ethnic and religious backgrounds and asking for 
stronger protection of Slovakia’s internal borders. 
Slovakia is a relatively young country with no experience of immigrants, 
except for that of legal migrants coming to the state in the times of Soviet in-
fluence in the region. This lack of experience with migrants points to the vul-
nerability and manipulability of Slovak public opinion and creates space for 
the misinterpretation and securitization of the topic. This fact was particularly 
evident during the 2015 parliamentary election, when certain radical political 
parties crossed the 5% hurdle and made it into Parliament, although this cer-
tainly cannot be solely ascribed to their stance on the migration crisis. The ge-
nerally negative public attitude towards third country migrants was exploited 
in the electoral campaigns of the Slovak political parties, which reached an 
unprecedented conformity regarding solutions to the crisis. All of the parties 
rejected the mandatory quotas on migrants proposed by the EU and were in fa-
vour of supporting the solutions in migrants ending and transit countries. Yet, 
certain differences were obvious in terms of the treatment of migrants already 
present on European territory, based on the increasing radicalization of certain 
parts of the political spectrum in Slovakia.
Similarly, the crisis had a significant impact on Slovak foreign policy, not only 
on the V4 level, but also in relation to the EU as a whole following the Slovak pre-
sidency of the Council of the European Union from June to December 2016.
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4.5.1. SR-V4 Cooperation
The attitude of the V4 countries towards solutions to the migration cri-
sis is characterized by a high degree of unity. Common features include the 
rejection of the mandatory quota for the redistribution of asylum seekers in 
the EU; the voluntary-based solution to the situation; the increased protection 
of the Schengen Area’s external borders and cooperation with source and trans-
it countries of immigrants in the Middle East and sub-Saharan Africa. Besi-
des, similarities are also to be found in high levels of anti-migrant and anti-
Muslim feeling – not only at the highest political levels, but among the public 
of the aforementioned states. The most significant conformity is visible in the 
attitudes of the Slovak Republic and Hungary regarding the issue of obligato-
ry quotas. Following the Slovak Action for annulment to the Court of Justice 
C-643/15 of 2 December 2015, challenging the legality of the Asylum Seekers 
Relocation Decision85 of 22 September 2015, Hungary filed a similar action 
just one day later, on Thursday 3 December (pending case C-647/15). On 
the contrary, Poland did not follow the V4 line and voted for the adoption of 
the Council Decision (EU) 2015/1601, despite the fact that the current Polish 
government seems to reflect the attitude of the remaining V4 countries regar-
ding new immigrants coming to the territory of the European Union. Certain 
differences are also visible when comparing the attitudes of the heads of states 
of the particular V4 countries. As noted above, the President of the Slovak Re-
public is considered to be the most liberal politician in Central Europe regar-
ding the migration issue, whereas the other presidents are stricter. Despite this, 
generally, Central Europe is depicted as a radical opponent of the proposed 
measures adopted to solve the migration crisis in the European Union, whi-
le the V4 states are considered to lack solidarity with Southern Mediterranean 
and Western Balkan countries – the regions most burdened by migration due 
to their geographical proximity to migrant source regions. Nevertheless, despite 
its negative connotations for the EU, we can conclude that the migration crisis 
has repeatedly confirmed the unity of the V4 member states’ opinions, as well 
as the general importance of the group as it serves as a platform facilitating the 
enforcement of its members’ interests on the EU level. 
4.5.2. SR-EU Relations
Regarding the influence of the migration crisis on the position of the Slo-
vak Republic in the European Union, it is necessary to point out both the ad-
vantages and disadvantages the crisis has had for the country on the European 
85 Council Decision (EU) 2015/1601 of 22 September 2015 establishing provisional measures in the 
area of international protection for the benefit of Italy and Greece.
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level. Bearing in mind the consequences of the aforementioned Slovak Action 
for annulment to the Court of Justice (C-643/15) against the Council decision 
2015/1601, it can be observed that the EU has perceived the country more ne-
gatively than ever since Slovakia joined the Union. Most reproaches attack Slo-
vakia’s lack of solidarity with people seeking asylum as well as with Southern 
member states. Another issue is the alleged anti-discriminatory rhetoric of the 
Slovak government. In this case, the main problem was the country’s decision 
to accept only Christian asylum seekers out of respect to the cultural and reli-
gious demands of the Slovak people. On the one hand, Slovakia is bound by 
the principle of solidarity – one of the underlying standards of the European 
Union. Yet, the problem with solidarity is its legal non-enforceability. Therefo-
re, it is more a generally accepted value than a legal norm. On the other hand, 
the decision is a manifestation of the state’s sovereignty – one of the main at-
tributes of statehood. Slovakia is a sovereign state and therefore it has the ri-
ght to decide whether to allow the entrance of foreigners onto state territory or 
not. Moreover, the Slovak government was established after a democratic par-
liamentary election. In the election, Slovak citizens chose representatives who 
are supposed to represent the will and opinion of the electorate – which is the 
basic principle of a representative democracy. If the citizens of the state do not 
favour the acceptance of asylum seekers, the government is – at least partially 
– obliged to take this opinion into account. 
However, the migration crisis has also had certain positive consequences for 
the country. The crisis has created the opportunity for Slovakia, and the V4 as 
a whole, to show its strength when it comes to solving problems on the EU le-
vel. The rejection of mandatory quotas and its different approach compared to 
other member states meant that Slovakia and the V4 are nowadays perceived as 
independent and relevant actors and fully-fledged members of the EU, which 
must be taken into account in the formation of EU policies. As noted by Terem 
and Lenč,86 the migration crisis has become “...an indicator of whether Cen-
tral Europe is able to exert influence in its position in international relations, 
or whether it remains only an object of the great powers’ interests.”
86 P. Terem, M. Lenč, op. cit., p. 681.
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